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Risky decision-making is altered in humans and
animals with damage to the orbitofrontal cortex.
However, the cellular function of the intact orbitofron-
tal cortex in processing information relevant for risky
decisions is unknown. We recorded responses of
single orbitofrontal neurons while monkeys viewed
visual cues representing the key decision parame-
ters, reward risk and value. Risk was defined as the
mathematical variance of binary symmetric proba-
bility distributions of reward magnitudes; value was
defined as nonrisky rewardmagnitude. Monkeys dis-
played graded behavioral preferences for risky
outcomes, as they did for value. A population of orbi-
tofrontal neurons showed a distinctive risk signal:
their cues and reward responses covaried monoton-
ically with the variance of the different reward distri-
butions without monotonically coding reward value.
Furthermore, a small but statistically significant frac-
tionof risk responses also coded reward value. These
risk signals may provide physiological correlates for
the role of the orbitofrontal cortex in risk processing.INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty is a ubiquitous component of our environment, such
that humans and animals are regularly confronted with condi-
tions that vary in degrees of uncertainty. It is therefore a funda-
mental requirement of our brain systems to accurately process
uncertain information so that we may function appropriately,
both in our mundane day-to-day activities and in more profound
moments.
Many brain regions including the frontal cortex, basal ganglia,
amygdala, parietal cortex, cingulate cortex, and insular cortex
have been identified as key areas in processing information
about uncertain rewards (Christopoulos et al., 2009; Fiorillo
et al., 2003; Huettel et al., 2006; Knoch et al., 2006; Kuhnen
and Knutson, 2005; Levy et al., 2010; McCoy and Platt, 2005;
Preuschoff et al., 2006, 2008; Tobler et al., 2009; Xue et al.,
2009). In particular, a large amount of research has focused on
the orbitofrontal cortex. Damage to the ventromedial and orbito-
frontal cortex leads to altered patterns of risky choice behavior
(Bechara et al., 1994; Clark et al., 2008; Hsu et al., 2005; Mobiniet al., 2002; Pais-Vieira et al., 2007; Rogers et al., 1999; Sanfey
et al., 2003). In accordance with these findings, activations in
the orbitofrontal cortex vary explicitly with risk (Critchley et al.,
2001; Hsu et al., 2005; Kepecs et al., 2008; Tobler et al., 2007).
In addition, neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex encode the value
of available reward in a large variety of behavioral situations and
in relation to the subjects’ preferences (Hikosaka andWatanabe,
2000; Kennerley et al., 2009; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006;
Peters and Bu¨chel, 2009; Roesch and Olson, 2004; Thorpe et al.,
1983; Tremblay and Schultz, 1999; Wallis and Miller, 2003).
Thus, the orbitofrontal cortex appears to play an important role
in processing both reward risk and reward value.
Although the orbitofrontal cortex is implicated in processing
reward risk and value information, the capacity for individual
neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex to explicitly encode risk
information is unknown. We define risk as a form of uncertainty
measured by the variance or standard deviation of known
probability distributions of reward magnitudes (second central
moment), rather than the occasionally used common sensical
probability of losing. The purpose of this study was to test
whether reward risk is encoded by neurons in the orbitofrontal
cortex and, if so, to what extent such a risk signal would be
distinct from the known value signal in this cortical area. Since
risk is known to influence the subjective value of reward, a value
signal might also covary with risk without constituting a genuine
risk signal. Therefore, to identify a genuine risk signal, we found
it essential to search for a stand-alone neuronal risk response
that did not also encode value. To achieve this, we designed
a simple task in which monkeys were presented with visual
cues with distinct information about either the risk or the value
of an upcoming juice reward. We recorded neuronal data under
nonchoice conditions in which the monkeys had to perform an
ocular saccade to the same location at which a single cue had
been presented (left or right). Based on previous studies investi-
gating reward processing in the orbitofrontal cortex, we predom-
inantly targeted areas 11 and 13 (Kobayashi et al., 2010; Padoa-
Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Tremblay and Schultz, 1999; Wallis
and Miller, 2003). We found populations of orbitofrontal neurons
that tracked the risk in predicted and received rewards in amono-
tonic fashion. True to the requirement of genuine risk coding,
most of these neurons failed to also encode reward value.
RESULTS
Behavioral Preference for Risk and Value
This experiment varied separately the risk and value of liquid
rewards. We used a formal definition of risk characterized byNeuron 68, 789–800, November 18, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 789
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R1 R2 R3 V1 V2 V3
Cues:
Large reward (ml): 0.33 0.36 0.42
0.18 0.3 0.42Small reward (ml): 0.27 0.24 0.18
Expected value (ml): 0.3
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Figure 1. Independent Variation of Risk and Value
(A) Variations in reward risk. R1–R3 represent binary distributions of reward magnitude with equal probability (p = 0.5). R1–R3 differ in statistical variance (hori-
zontal arrows), but not in expected value (dashed line).
(B) Variations in reward value. V1–V3 represent three reward magnitudes with fixed probabilities of p = 1.0.
(C) Graphical representation of the relationship between risk and value in (A) and (B).
(D) The trial types (R1–R3 and V1–V3), visual cues, and actual measures used in the experimental design. For the bar cues, the possible juice volumes to be deliv-
ered were represented by the elevation of the horizontal bars.
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Risk and Value Signals in Orbitofrontal NeuronsRothschild and Stiglitz (1970), namely themathematical variance
of a known probability distribution. According to this definition
the expected value (mean) is kept constant with different vari-
ances (the ‘‘mean-preserving spread’’). We employed three
levels of risk by using three different distributions with two equi-
probable reward magnitudes (p = 0.5 each) and identical
expected value. For example, as shown in Figure 1A, distribution
R3 is the most risky distribution, whereas distribution R1 has the
lowest risk. This definition of risk is consistent with those used in
previous behavioral and neurobiological studies (Christopoulos
et al., 2009; McCoy and Platt, 2005; Weber et al., 2004). We
tested reward value without risk by varying the reward magni-
tude (Figure 1B). Figure 1C shows the relationship between the
risk and value parameters. Figure 1D shows the actual measures
of the reward distributions used in the experiment.
Two rhesus macaque monkeys performed a saccadic eye
movement task for juice reward (Figure 2A). The animal touched
a key and fixated on a spot in the center of a computer monitor
while a visual cue was presented to the left or right of the spot.
Our cues used the vertical position of horizontal bars to repre-
sent the magnitude of reward that would be delivered (the higher
the bar, the greater the magnitude; Figure 1D). Risk conditions
were indicated by cues containing bars at low and high vertical790 Neuron 68, 789–800, November 18, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.positions, representing the low and high equiprobable reward
magnitudes, respectively. Cues with a single bar indicated that
there was no risk and that the reward magnitude represented
by the height of the bar would always be delivered (p = 1.0).
To control for visual components, we also used a set of abstract
fractal pictures for predicting outcome (Figure 1D).
We first quantified the monkeys’ behavioral preference for the
risky options in a choice task inwhich left or right eyemovements
indicated the monkeys’ preferred option. In choice trials,
monkeys chose between a safe option and a risky option (Fig-
ure 2B). The expected value of each risk option matched the
expected value of the safe option (V2 in Figure 1D) to detect
sensitivity to risk per se without confounding differences in
expected value. Both monkeys preferred the riskier options to
the safe option (Figure 2B; two-way ANOVA: main effect of
risk, F (2, 16) = 48.74, p < 0.001). The preference for risk was
not significantly different between the two cue sets (main effect
of cue set F (1, 8) = 0.18, p = 0.682; cue set 3 risk interaction,
F (2, 16) = 1.161, p = 0.338). In addition, we measured reaction
times to release the key during neuronal recording trials in which
single risk or value cues were presented. Figure 2C shows that
reaction times decreased as a function of increasing risk and
value. Single linear regressions revealed a significant effect of
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Figure 2. Behavioral Task, Measurements,
and Neuronal Recording Area
(A) Behavioral task. Visual cues were presented on
a monitor while monkeys fixated on a spot in the
center of the screen and contacted a touch-sensi-
tive key. For all neuronal recordings only one
cue was displayed per trial, to the left or right of
the fixation spot. After the fixation spot was
extinguished the monkey was required to make
a saccade to the sidewhere thecuewasdisplayed.
After a successful saccade, a red dot appeared
in this location for one second before turning
green, indicating that the trial was complete and
the key should be released to receive a juice
reward.
(B) Behavioral preference for the risky options.
In choice trials, two cues were presented simulta-
neously, on either side of the fixation spot.
After the fixation spot was extinguished, the
monkey was required to make a saccade to
either side. Options were always between the
medium value (safe) cue (V2 in Figure 1D) and
one of the three risk cues. Each point in the graph
shows the mean preference (±SEM), measured
as percent of risky choices. In all three risk condi-
tions both monkeys chose the risky option more
than 50% on average and the preference for
the risk option increased as a function of increas-
ing risk (two-way ANOVA: main effect of risk,
F (2, 16) = 48.74, p < 0.001). The preference for
risk was not significantly different between the two cue sets (main effect of cue set F (1, 8) = 0.18, p = 0.682; cue set 3 risk interaction, F (2, 16) = 1.161,
p = 0.338).
(C) Behavioral discrimination of risk and value during neuronal recording trials. Data points are mean reaction times (±SEM) to release the key for reward from
114 blocks of trials. Reaction times decreased as a function of increasing risk (p = 0.073) and value (p = 0.001), and the slope for risk was not significantly
different from the slope for value (p > 0.1; two-tailed t test).
(D) (Top) Sagittal view of the brain showing roughly the anterior-posterior extent of the region (thin vertical lines) where all neuronal data presented was
recorded. (Bottom) Coronal view of a slice of the left hemisphere at the anterior-posterior region indicated by the thick vertical line in the upper image of
the sagittal view. Shaded area denotes the targeted region of orbitofrontal cortex where all data presented was recorded from (±2.5 mm anterior-posterior).
Numbers refer to architectonic areas. PS, principal sulcus; AS, arcuate sulcus; CGS, cingulate sulcus.
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Risk and Value Signals in Orbitofrontal Neuronsvalue (p = 0.001) and a lesser, not statistically significant, effect
of risk (p = 0.073). The difference in regression slopes (b)
between these regressions was nonsignificant (p > 0.1; two-
tailed t test). These findings are consistent with previous
evidence for risk-seeking behavior in macaques (Hayden and
Platt, 2007; McCoy and Platt, 2005).
Neuronal Data Analysis and Database
We sampled electrophysiological activity from 722 single orbito-
frontal neurons while the monkeys were presented with cues
predicting different levels of reward risk and/or value. We
recorded and saved the activity of neurons that appeared to
respond to at least one task event during online inspection of
several trials. This procedure resulted in a database from 262 or-
bitofrontal neurons, which we analyzed statistically in two
consecutive steps. In the first step we defined task-related
responses with the Wilcoxon test as significantly different
neuronal activity during a given task epoch compared with that
from a 1 s control period immediately preceding the central fixa-
tion spot. The task epochs analyzed were 0.1–0.6 s after cue
appearance; 0.5 s immediately before the saccade, key release,
and reward; 0.5 s immediately after the saccade and after keyrelease; and four nonoverlapping, consecutive epochs of 0.5 s
each after the reward. In the second step of the analysis, we as-
sessed the monotonic neuronal coding of the two specific
parameters of interest, namely risk and value of reward with
single and multiple linear regressions on the task-related
responses identified by the Wilcoxon test.
Risk Coding
The Wilcoxon test assessed all risky trial types together and
identified a total of 1462 task-related responses in 262 neurons,
with many neurons showing multiple task relationships. Single
linear regressions using the mathematical variance as risk
regressor (9, 36, 144 3 104) revealed that 160 of the 1462
task-related responses (11%) correlated significantly with risk
(p < 0.05, two-tailed t test against 0 slope). Figure 3A shows
four typical responses with positive correlation coefficients
during four different task epochs. Figure 3B shows population
averages of all responses with significant positive correlation
coefficients during the same four task epochs. Figure 3C shows
the numbers of responses with significant positive and negative
correlation coefficients at each task epoch. Table 1 shows the
numbers and percentages of significant risk coding responsesNeuron 68, 789–800, November 18, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 791
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Figure 3. Orbitofrontal Neurons Code Risk
(A) Smoothed histograms showing examples of
individual risk-sensitive neurons to the cue, key
release, prereward, and postreward. For presen-
tation purposes the raster plots are rearranged
and blocked vertically by trial type (indicated by
the cues beside the leftmost raster plots). The
last ten trials for each trial type are displayed.
The shaded area shows the time window used
for analysis (correlation coefficients for all neurons,
p < 0.05, two-tailed t test).
(B) Smoothed histograms showing population
responses from all neurons with significant posi-
tive correlation coefficients for risk during the
shaded period (top panels). The bottom panels
show the mean firing rates (±SEM) during the
shaded period in the upper panels. Orange = low
risk; brown = medium risk; green = high risk.
(C) Numbers of risk-related responses with signif-
icant positive and negative correlation coefficients
in all task epochs.
Neuron
Risk and Value Signals in Orbitofrontal Neuronsin each task epoch, amounting to 6%–18% of task-related
responses in the different epochs. The 160 risk-related
responses occurred in a total of 109 neurons. The majority of
these neurons (79/109; 72%) showed a significant response to
risk in only one task epoch, with some neurons showing signifi-
cant responses in two (24/109; 22%) or more (6/109; 6%) task
epochs. The 109 orbitofrontal neurons with risk-related res-
ponses were located in areas 11 (34 neurons), 12 (2 neurons),
13 (70 neurons), and 14 (3 neurons) (Figure 2D).
We also analyzed the 1462 task-related responses with stan-
dard deviation as risk regressor. Most risk responses displayed
significant correlations for both variance and standard deviation.
Figure 4 shows the close correlations between the r-squared
values derived from the analysis with the two risk regressors792 Neuron 68, 789–800, November 18, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.u
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to(Pearson’s r = 0.97, p < 0.01). Similarly
small proportions of responses were
significant for only one of the two risk
measures (gray and white circles in Fig-
ure 4; c2 = 2, p = 0.2; chi-square test),
and varied closely around the statistical
threshold (p < 0.05). Because the mean
was constant across all trial types
involving risk, the coefficient of variation
(standard deviation/mean; Weber et al.,
2004) as risk measure resulted in the
same, albeit rescaled, results. Thus,
these closely related risk measures
produced very comparable results. For
reasons of simplicity, we will present all
data with variance as risk regressor.
Taking the square root of an indepen-
dent variable steepens the slope of the
relationship with the dependent variable.
Indeed, because standard deviation is
the square root of variance, the effect
size measured by the slope (b) was larger
for standard deviation than variance. Thensigned mean b values were 0.81 for standard deviation and
.05 for variance.
It is possible that the neuronal responses to the cues reflected
e visual properties of the cues rather than the risk per se (Wallis
nd Miller, 2003). Therefore, we tested 113 of the 262 task-
lated neurons with the three risky bar cues and the three risky
bstract cues (Figure 1D). This sample included 19 neurons with
ue responses that showed significant positive correlations to
sk (they belonged to the 25 neurons with cue responses with
ositive slope shown in Figure 3B, left panels). Of the 19 neurons,
6 also showed significant positive risk correlation coefficients
ith the abstract risk cues (Figure 5); the remaining three
eurons responded to the abstract cues in the same fashion as
the bar cues, but without reaching significance. Thus, the
Table 1. Significant Risk Responses in Each Task Epoch
Task epoch Cue Pre-sacc Sacc Pre-kr Kr Pre-rew Rew1 Rew2 Rew3 Rew4 Total
Task-related 180 129 152 165 160 164 174 158 126 54 1462
Risk-sensitive 32 13 9 12 13 14 29 21 10 6 159
in percent 18 10 6 7 8 9 17 13 8 11 11
Slope (+/) 25/12 10/3 7/2 7/5 8/5 14/0 20/9 15/6 5/5 4/2 115/44
Task-related responses were defined by theWilcoxon test (p < 0.05), and risk sensitivity was defined by single linear regression (p < 0.05; t test against
0 slope). Task epochs were as follows: 0.1–0.6 s after cue onset (cue); 0.5 s presaccade (pre-sacc), 0.5 s prekey release (pre-kr); 0.5 s prereward (pre-
rew); 0.5 s after saccade onset (sacc); 0.5 s after key release (kr); and four consecutive postreward epochs of 0.5 s each (rew1–rew4).
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Figure 4. Mathematical Variance and Standard Deviation Were Both
Considered as Measures of Risk
R-squared values from all neurons with significant correlation coefficients for
variance and standard deviation from separate single linear regression anal-
yses. Black circles represent neurons with significant r-squared values for
both variance and standard deviation. White circles represent neurons with
significant r-squared values for standard deviation and nonsignificant
r-squared values for variance. Gray circles represent neurons with significant
r-squared values for variance and nonsignificant r-squared values for standard
deviation. The r-squared values were significantly related (Pearson’s correla-
tion). Line represents unity, alongwhich both r-squared values would be equal.
Neuron
Risk and Value Signals in Orbitofrontal Neuronsneuronal responses to the risky cues appeared to reflect the risk
information conveyed by the cues rather than their visual
properties.
Risk and Value Coding
Because the animals expressed behavioral preferences during
both risk and value trials, it was necessary to determine the
extent to which the neuronal responses reflected risk per se or
some aspect of value associatedwith the risky outcomes. There-
fore, we tested 493 of the sampled 722 orbitofrontal neuronswith
three value cues in addition to the three risky cues (Figure 1D).
This design allowed us to collect neuronal data from six different,
pseudorandomly alternating trial types in total, three of which
varied in risk but had constant expected value, and three that
varied in value with no risk (see Experimental Procedures for
a description of the task design with separate risk and value
trials). The Wilcoxon test identified 1083 task-related responses
in 98 orbitofrontal neurons that were investigated in both risk and
value trials; many neurons showed multiple task relationships.
We analyzed the 1083 responses with two separate linear
regressions on risk in the risk trials (variances of 9, 36, 144 3
104) and on value in the value trials (magnitudes of 0.18, 0.30,
0.42 ml). The average number of trials per neuron was 13 for
each of the three risk cues and 11 for each of the three value
cues.
Of the 1083 task-related responses, 201 (19%) correlated
significantly with risk, value, or both (p < 0.05, two-tailed t test
against 0 slope). Of these 201 responses, 45 responses varied
monotonically with risk only (Figure 6A), 138 responses varied
monotonically with value only (Figure 6B), and 18 responses
varied monotonically with both risk and value (Figure 6C), thus
resulting in a total of 63 risk responses and 156 value responses
(Tables 2 and 3). Of the 18 responses varying monotonically with
both risk and value, 13 responses coded both variables with the
same slope orientation and thus shared the same valence,
whereas the remaining 5 responses showed opposite valence
(green and gold sectors in Figure 6C, respectively). Figure 6D
shows a scatter plot of the significant t values of the regression
coefficients from risk and value responses.
To formally test whether the responses tended to code risk
and value separately or in combination, we performed a chi-
square test on a 2 3 2 contingency table of the significant and
nonsignificant responses for risk and value (Table 3). The result
suggested a significantly higher propensity for combined risk
and value coding as opposed to separate coding of the two vari-
ables in the population of responses (c2 = 11, p = 0.001).The 201 risk- and value-related responses occurred in a total
of 98 neurons. These neurons did not show differential distribu-
tions between orbitofrontal areas 11 and 13, in which most of
these neurons were recorded (n = 94; c2 = 0.48, p = 0.49; chi-
square test). Separating the neurons according to their
responses to risk only, to value only, and to risk and value in
combination showed similar nondifferential anatomical distribu-
tions (c2 = 1.9, p = 0.38). The very few neurons (n = 4) recorded in
closely neighboring parts of area 14 were not included in the
chi-square test. Taken together, the risk- and value-coding
neurons described in this study were not differentially distributed
in the regions of orbitofrontal cortex investigated (shaded area in
Figure 2D).
We also compared the effect sizes for risk and value by using
the slopes (b) of the regressions. Although risk and value ranges
were chosen arbitrarily, some comparisons were possible
within the ranges used. The effect size for risk was smaller
compared with that for value when the mathematical varianceNeuron 68, 789–800, November 18, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 793
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Figure 5. Cue Responses Reflect the Risk and Not the Visual Prop-
erties of the Cues
(A) Example of a single neuron with significant correlation coefficients for risk
for both the risky bar (p < 0.001, two-tailed t test) and abstract cues (p = 0.005,
two-tailed t test).
(B) Population responses of 16 neurons with significant correlation coefficients
for both cue sets. (Conventions same as in Figure 3).
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Risk and Value Signals in Orbitofrontal Neuronswas used as risk measure (unsigned mean b values: p < 0.001;
two-tailed t test), and greater than that for value with standard
deviation (square root of variance) as risk measure (unsigned
mean b values: p < 0.001). Thus, the effect sizes for the two
risk measures straddled the effect size for value, suggesting
similar effects of risk and value within the ranges of risk and
value used.794 Neuron 68, 789–800, November 18, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.Risk Coding after Outcome
The risk-sensitive neuronal responses to reward delivery shown
in Figures 3A and 3B (right) and in Figure 6A were surprising
because the risk had been resolved at that point. Furthermore,
in the risky trials, the rewards occurred at the time of delivery
in one of the two fixed magnitudes of each binary distribution,
yet the risk-related responses appeared to covary with the risk,
irrespective of the low and high reward magnitudes actually
obtained. The fact that only a single magnitude of reward was
delivered in risky trials afforded us with an additional approach
for testing the coding of risk and value. Specifically, unlike the
previous linear regression analysis wherewe compared separate
single regressors on neuronal responses from separate trials,
we were able to use multiple regressions on the same neuronal
responses (to a single reward) in the same (risky) trials across
the two regressors, risk and value (reward magnitude). The
Wilcoxon test assessed the six risky trial types with their
different reward outcomes separately and identified 641
task-related responses during one or more of the four postre-
ward epochs in 231 orbitofrontal neurons, with many neurons
showing multiple postreward responses. We analyzed the 641
task-related responses with multiple linear regressions using
reward risk (variances of 9, 36, 144 3 104) and value (reward
magnitudes of 0.18, 0.24, 0.30, 0.33, 0.36, 0.42 ml) as
regressors.
Of the 641 postreward responses, 42 responses (7%) showed
significant partial correlation coefficients for risk, and 105
responses, for value (16%) (p < 0.05, two-tailed t test against
0 slope; Table 4). Figures 7A and 7B show the responses of
neurons with positive slopes for reward magnitude and risk,
respectively. Importantly, the responses in Figure 7B varied
monotonically with the risk associated with each reward, inde-
pendent of the reward magnitude (Figure 7C). For example, the
juice volumes 0.18 and 0.42ml were distinctly different in magni-
tude, but they were associated with the same amount of risk (see
Figure 1A) and drew the same neuronal response. As before, for
the chosen ranges of risk and value, the effect size for risk was
smaller compared to that for value when variance was used as
the risk measure (unsigned mean b values: p < 0.001; two-tailed
t test) and greater than the effect size for value with standard
deviation as the risk measure (unsigned mean b values: p <
0.001). Thus, plotting neuronal responses as a function of vari-
ance resulted in a flatter slope for risk compared with that for
reward magnitude (Figures 7A and 7B).
However, as a possible alternative to risk coding, the pattern
of activity observed in Figures 7B and 7Cmay represent nonmo-
notonic reward magnitude coding. In particular, the data from
risky trials, when plotted across reward magnitude (Figure 7C),
suggests quadratic reward magnitude coding. If this were the
case, these neurons should code reward magnitude nonmono-
tonically also in nonrisk trials. To assess this possibility, we
also tested 14 of the neurons presented in Figures 7B and 7C
with the nonrisky value cues (Figure 7D). These 14 neurons
showed 14 of the 32 risk responses with positive slope shown
in Figure 7B. Fitting the neuronal responses in value trials with
linear and quadratic functions revealed that 11 of these 14 risk
neurons (79%) did not code reward magnitude (linear and qua-
dratic least mean squares fits were both nonsignificant; F-test,
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Figure 6. Risk and Value Coding
(A) Example of an orbitofrontal neuron that coded the risk associated with reward and not value. The left panel shows the neuron’s firing rate during risk trials. The
middle panel shows the firing rate during value trials. The right panel shows the average firing rate (±SEM) during the shaded periods. Regression lines were fitted
to the risk (red) and value (blue) trials. Only the correlation coefficient for the risk trials was significant (p < 0.005, two-tailed t test).
(B) Example of an orbitofrontal neuron that codes the value and not the risk associated with reward. Conventions as in (A). Only the correlation coefficient for the
value trials was significant (p < 0.001, two-tailed t test).
(C) Pie chart of the percentage of responses characterized by significant correlation coefficients for risk and/or value.
(D) Scatter plot of significant regression coefficients (p < 0.05, two-tailed t test) for risk (red), value (blue), or both (green, equal valence; gold, nonequal valence).
The data points from responses that were nonsignificant for both variables are not shown for simplicity of display. Circles = saccade activity; triangles = key touch
activity; plus sign = reward activity.
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Risk and Value Signals in Orbitofrontal Neuronsp > 0.05). Of the remaining three neurons, two showed significant
correlation coefficients for both quadratic and linear functions (F-
test, p < 0.03), and one showed a significant linear function only
(F-test, p = 0.04). Therefore, themajority of these neurons appear
to be coding reward risk rather than coding reward magnitude
nonmonotonically. In addition, these data indicate that 21% (3/
14) of reward risk coding responses potentially also code reward
value, which is similar to the proportion of risk responses also
coding reward value shown in Figure 6C (29%; 18/63; Table 2).
DISCUSSION
This study investigated the neuronal coding of reward risk, using
the statistical variance of binary probability distributions of
rewardmagnitudes as riskmeasure.We found that a group of or-
bitofrontal neurons coded information about reward risk in
a positive or negative monotonic fashion across three risk levels.
The risk coding occurred also with standard deviation as riskmeasure and was independent of the visual aspects of the
risk-predicting cues. The majority of risk responses failed to
vary monotonically with value, suggesting genuine coding of
reward risk. However, a minority of risk-sensitive neurons also
encoded reward value, and their propensity for value coding
was significantly higher than that in the overall population of or-
bitofrontal neurons. Some orbitofrontal neurons also showed
risk coding after the rewardwhen the riskwas resolved. Thus, or-
bitofrontal neurons appear to vary monotonically with the first
two moments of probability distributions of reward magnitudes,
namely expected value and variance (risk).
Neuronal Processing of Risk
Previous studies investigating the neural basis of risk processing
in humans have used several versions of the Iowa Gambling task
and variations in reward probability (Bach et al., 2009; Bechara
et al., 1994; Clark et al., 2008; Critchley et al., 2001; Knoch
et al., 2006; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Levy et al., 2010; PetersNeuron 68, 789–800, November 18, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 795
Table 2. Risk and Value Responses in Each Task Epoch
Task epoch Cue Pre-sacc Sacc Pre-kr Kr Pre-rew Rew1 Rew2 Rew3 Rew4 Total
Task-related 126 94 98 115 109 103 126 123 100 89 1083
Risk-sensitive 16 7 5 4 4 3 11 7 4 2 63
in percent 13 7 5 3 4 3 9 6 4 2 6
Slope (+/) 10/6 4/3 4/1 3/1 4/0 3/0 6/5 3/4 1/3 2/0 40/23
Value-sensitive 42 9 6 16 2 11 22 20 18 10 156
in % 33 10 6 14 2 11 17 16 18 11 14
Slope (+/) 19/23 4/5 3/3 8/8 1/1 8/3 15/7 15/5 10/8 6/4 89/67
Both sensitive 7 1 1 1 0 1 1 4 1 1 18
in percent 6 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 1 1 2
Slope (+//op) 4/3/0 0/1/0 0/1/0 0/0/1 0 1/0/0 1/0/0 1/0/3 1/0/0 0/0/1 8/5/5
The numbers and percentages of 63 risk-sensitive and 156 value-sensitive responses include the 18 responses sensitive to both risk and value.
Although 63 and 156 responses add up to 219, the total number of significant responses to both variables was 201 (= 156 + 63 – 18). op, opposite
slopes for risk versus value. Task epochs were as in Table 1.
Neuron
Risk and Value Signals in Orbitofrontal Neuronsand Bu¨chel, 2009; Xue et al., 2009). Other studies have assessed
riskprocessing according to thedefinition of riskasmathematical
variance or standard deviation of probability distributions used
in economics and finance (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). This
definition provides a monotonic measure of risk, allowing
a simpler andmore straightforward identification of anybiological
response to the risk in the environment, as shown also by the use
of linear regression models in our study. Using this approach,
previous studies have identified risk processing in the human
frontal cortex, parietal cortex, cingulate cortex, striatum, and
amygdala (Christopoulos et al., 2009; Hsu et al., 2005; Huettel
et al., 2006; Sanfey et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2009). Certainly
variations in probability can be expressed as nonmonotonic
changes in risk, and this has been done to identify the involve-
ment of frontal cortex, striatum, and dopamine neurons in risk
processing (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Tobler
et al., 2007). However, task designs that manipulate variance
while holding probability constant are more straightforward
and have facilitated the identification of risk or utility signals
in single neurons in the posterior cingulate cortex (McCoy and
Platt, 2005) and of risk signals in our study in the orbitofrontal
cortex.
The onset of differential risk-related activity we observed in the
orbitofrontal cortex occurred as early as 100 ms after cue
presentation. This latency appears to be shorter than the risk-
related responses in dopamine neurons (Fiorillo et al., 2003)
and also possibly that in cingulate neurons (McCoy and Platt,
2005). Specifically, the risk-related responses in dopamineTable 3. Risk and Value Responses
Value Nonvalue Total
Risk 18 45 63
Nonrisk 138 882 1020
Total 156 927 1083
Responses were grouped according to the statistical significance of the t
values for the regression slopes for each variable. Responses prefixed
with ‘‘non-’’ showed nonsignificant t values for the corresponding
regressor.
796 Neuron 68, 789–800, November 18, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.neurons began relatively late after cue presentation and ramped
up gradually until reward delivery. In the cingulate cortex, the risk
or utility-related activity was most clearly observed after move-
ments had been initiated. Therefore, the risk-sensitive orbito-
frontal neurons observed in this study may constitute an early
component of a system that processes risky information,
perhaps before it is transmitted to other brain systems such as
the dopamine neurons and cingulate cortex. This early response
may possibly allow these orbitofrontal neurons to participate in
detecting risk in decision situations involving uncertainty.
Risk-Related Utility Coding
It is well known that risk influences the subjective value, or utility,
of uncertain choices and determines behavioral preferences
(Bernoulli, 1738). In common with our study, previous neuro-
physiological studies of risk processing did not directly address
whether the risk activity observed was dissociable from a utility
signal (Fiorillo et al., 2003; McCoy and Platt, 2005). A single-
unit study in the orbitofrontal cortex that used a behavioral test
for preferences provides a more direct assessment of utility
coding (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006), but this study only
employed certain, nonrisky outcomes. It would be possible to
directly investigate a risk-related utility signal by using a similar
design to that employed by Padoa-Schioppa and Assad
(2006), but with risky options similar to those used in our task.
Importantly, however, any such design would need to be able
to distinguish between a subjective value signal for risk and
a risk signal per se. For example, the risk signal in posterior
cingulate cortex reported by McCoy and Platt (2005) was equiv-
alent to the monkeys’ behavioral preference and was therefore
indistinguishable from a utility signal. Human studies have
used behavioral preferences to identify risk signals that depend
upon risk attitude (Christopoulos et al., 2009; Hsu et al., 2005;
Huettel et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007). Furthermore, a recent
study used this approach and provided evidence for combined
coding of value and risk in the lateral prefrontal cortex (Tobler
et al., 2009). Future single neuron studies of risk processing
will benefit from distinguishing the subjective value of risky
outcomes (utility) and the objective risk (mathematical variance).
Table 4. Risk and Magnitude Responses after Reward Delivery
Task epoch Rew1 Rew2 Rew3 Rew4 Total
Reward-related 185 172 145 139 641
Risk-sensitive 19 12 7 4 42
in percent 10 7 5 3 7
Slope (+/) 13/6 9/3 6/1 4/0 32/10
Magnitude-sensitive 27 30 26 22 105
in percent 15 17 18 16 16
Slope (+/) 19/8 16/14 13/13 17/5 65/40
Responses to reward delivery in the four postreward periods were iden-
tified by the Wilcoxon test (p < 0.05). The risk and magnitude sensitivities
were derived from subsequent multiple linear regressions in risk trials.
Note that only a single reward magnitude occurred in risk trials at the
time of reward delivery.
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reaction time data seem to suggest a higher, albeit not signifi-
cantly different, impact of value compared with risk within the
ranges used with these two parameters (see Figure 2C). Based
on this possibility, our neurons responding to both value and
riskmight have processed the utility associated with the different
levels of risk. However, the value neurons that did not show risk
coding may have been coding a utility signal that was undetect-
able with the risk cues because the utility variation due to risk
might have been too small. Nonetheless, using standard devia-
tion as risk regressor produced a larger effect of risk compared
with value for the neuronal responses within the risk and value
ranges used. If risk contributed to utility, these data suggest
that the utility variation due to risk may not have been so small.n = 65 n = 32
High risk
Med risk
Low risk
Reward magnitude neurons  Risk neuA B
Figure 7. Orbitofrontal Neurons Code Risk Also after Risk Is Resolved
(A) Reward magnitude coding following reward in risk trials. Data points show av
partial correlation coefficients for reward magnitude (p < 0.05, two-tailed t test).
(B) Risk coding following reward in risk trials. Postreward responses from risk tri
firing rates (±SEM) from 32 responses that had significant positive partial correla
(C) Same data from (B) plotted across reward magnitude, showing the nonlinear, q
function; F-test, p = 0.036).
(D) Risk responses did not code reward magnitude. Of the responses shown in (B)
average mean firing rates (±SEM) of these responses from the separate nonrisk
reward magnitudes.Yet the responses of the value-only neurons failed to vary mono-
tonically with the risk. Furthermore, the argument of potential
utility coding would not apply to those risk-sensitive neurons
that did not show value coding, as value coding would be neces-
sary for utility coding.
It has been suggested that risk seeking might result from
nonlinear weighting of rewards (Pratt, 1964). Although it is
possible that the risk-seeking behavior of our monkeys was
a result of an overweighting of the potential high rewards, the
neuronal responses to risk alone are unlikely to be explained in
this way because most of the neurons activated by the high-
risk cue were not encoding value. Thus potential value coding
does not seem to offer a general explanation for the observed
risk coding in most of our risk-sensitive neurons.
Our finding that risk-coding neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex
do not also frequently encode reward value monotonically is
similar to previous findings indicating that populations of orbito-
frontal neurons that are sensitive to probabilistic, costly, or
delayed rewards are insensitive to absolute reward value
(Kennerley and Wallis, 2009; Roesch et al., 2006). Therefore,
reward outcome coding in orbitofrontal cortex appears to extend
beyond a simple coding of reward value, incorporating additional
information relating to outcomes, such as their riskiness, likeli-
hood, cost, and temporal properties.
Neuronal Coding of Risk after Risk Is Resolved
The risk signal we observed following reward delivery might
seem surprising given that risk has been resolved by this stage.
However, these data are not unprecedented: previous studies
have reported risk-dependent modulation of neuronal responses
to the delivery of different reward magnitudes in the orbitofrontalrons  C
D
n = 14/32 (from B)
High Value
Med Value
Low Value
n = 32 (from B)
erage mean firing rates (±SEM) from 65 responses that had significant positive
als are from a different population of neurons from (A), showing average mean
tion coefficients for risk (p < 0.05, two-tailed t test).
uadratic relationship with reward magnitude (curve shows best fit to quadratic
, 14 were presented with both risk and nonrisky, value trials. Data points are the
y, value trials, showing the nondiscriminative responses to the fully predicted
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Risk and Value Signals in Orbitofrontal Neuronscortex (Roitman and Roitman, 2010) and posterior cingulate
cortex (Hayden et al., 2008). Although the latter study did not
vary risk monotonically, the data are strikingly similar to ours:
the study showed postreward responses to single outcomes
that were greater with no risk than with risk. Similar neuronal
responses at the time of outcome of uncertain decisions have
also been observed in the anterior cingulate cortex (Quilodran
et al., 2008). However, it should be noted that these risk-related
responses following reward delivery may represent other forms
of coding related to the reward, such as unsigned reward value
prediction errors. Further investigations are warranted to clearly
identify the relationship of postreward neuronal responses
following the resolution of risk. Nonetheless, such alternative
explanations do not apply to our data showing risk coding
preceding the reward.
Functional Overview
Under conditions of risk, the distributions of possible outcomes
are characterized by the mean outcome (expected value, the
first moment of probability distributions) and the risk (mathemat-
ical variance, the second central moment). Interestingly, in finan-
cial economics, mean-variance theory (Levy and Markowitz,
1979) is based on this distinction between expected value and
variance. Our data showing that some neurons in the orbitofron-
tal cortex encode these components separately would be
compatible with this notion. However, there are other economic
theories that provide alternative explanations for how reward
distribution information is processed under conditions of uncer-
tainty, such as expected utility theory (von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944) and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992). Our data indicating a propensity of
combined risk and value coding would not be incompatible
with these two theories. Overall, these results might suggest
physiological correlates for these theories but should not be
taken to distinguish between their validity, because we have
shown that risk and value are processed in different ways within
the same brain structure.
Our findings offer an interpretation of the well-known dysfunc-
tional decision making under conditions of uncertainty following
damage to the orbitofrontal cortex in humans (Bechara et al.,
1994; Clark et al., 2008; Hsu et al., 2005; Rogers et al., 1999;
Sanfey et al., 2003). We have identified a monotonic risk signal
in the orbitofrontal cortex that occurs in neurons that do not
necessarily display a monotonic value signal. Thus, changes in
decision making under uncertainty due to orbitofrontal damage
may result from an inability to accurately process risk informa-
tion. The absence of these neurons may be crucial for the
deficient decision-making abilities of patients with orbitofrontal
lesions. The deficit in decision-making under uncertainty in
orbitofrontal patients may not represent a decision deficit of
the highest cognitive order, but these patients may simply
assess risks inappropriately because they do not have the risk
signal propagated by the orbitofrontal neurons. Impaired risk
processing would constitute a parsimonious explanation for
the deficits in risky decision-making following damage to the
orbitofrontal cortex and would provide a potential pathophysio-
logical correlate for these striking and severely incapacitating
behavioral deficits.798 Neuron 68, 789–800, November 18, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects and Surgery
We used two adult male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), weighing
10–14 kg. The monkeys were implanted, under general anesthesia, with
a head holder and stainless steel chamber on the skull to enable daily record-
ings of single neurons. All surgical and experimental procedures were per-
formed under UK Home Office License in accordance with the requirements
of the United Kingdom Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986.
Behavioral Task
During training and testing, the monkeys were on a restricted water schedule
6 days of the week with 24 hr water ad libitum. The monkeys were trained to sit
in a restraining chair in front of a computer monitor with the head fixed and
perform a memory-guided saccade task. An aperture in the front of the chair
provided access to a touch-sensitive key. To commence a trial, monkeys
were required to fixate on a red spot in the center of the monitor and contact
the key. After 1.5 s, cues were displayed, in a pseudorandomized order, to the
left or right of the fixation spot for 0.5 s (Figure 2A). Fixation was maintained for
a further 2 s before the center spot extinguished and this was the signal for the
monkey to make a saccade to the left or right. A red fixation spot then
appeared in this peripheral location and the monkey was required to fixate
on this spot for 1 s before the spot turned green, which signified the end of
the trial, and at which point monkeys could break fixation and were required
to release contact with the key. Juice reward was delivered 1 s later. The
beginning of the next trial was indicated by the appearance of the central
fixation spot 3.5 s after the reward. Thus, the intertrial interval was 3.5 s, and
the total cycle time (trial duration + intertrial interval) was 10.5 s. The task con-
tained two categories of trials: imperative trials (as shown in Figure 2A), in
which a single cue was shown at either side of the central fixation spot and
the monkeys were required to make a saccade to that location; and choice
trials (Figure 2B), in which two cues were presented, one on either side of
the fixation spot, and the monkeys indicated their choice by making a saccade
to either location. The choice trials enabled assessment of the monkeys’
behavioral preference between the risky options and a safe option. Only imper-
ative trials were used during neuronal recording, and reaction time to key
release following the appearance of the green spot was measured.
The visual cues predicted the volume of juice to be delivered at the end of
each trial (Figure 1D). Juice delivery was controlled by a solenoid and
custom-designed software on a Macintosh IIfx computer (Apple). Juice
volume was explicitly represented by the elevation of the horizontal bars.
A single bar indicated that a certain volume of juice would be delivered
(p = 1; value cues). Two bars indicated one of two possible juice volumes
would be delivered (p = 0.5; risk cues). It was possible that the monkeys
preferred cues based on the visual properties (i.e., bar height) and likewise
the neuronal activity may have been sensitive to the visual properties of the
cues. Thus, an additional set of risk cues (abstract fractal images) was used
to control for any visual effects on behavioral and neuronal measurements,
and these were pseudocounterbalanced between monkeys (Figure 1D).
Also, if monkeys valued the risk cues differentially, it is possible that differential
neuronal activity in risk trials might reflect a subjective value signal rather than
a risk signal per se. We tested this hypothesis by comparing the activity of
a given neuron between risky trials and value trials. In summary, during
recording in imperative, single-cue trials, the cues were presented in two
blocks: a visual control block, consisting of three risky bar cues and three risky
abstract cues (Figure 1D); and a value control block, consisting of three risky
bar cues and three value bar cues (Figure 1D).
Neuronal Recording
Stereotaxic coordinates (Paxinos et al., 2000) were used to locate an area on
the skull that was removed to enable access to the orbitofrontal cortex. In
monkey A, after recording was completed, recording sites were marked with
small electrolytic lesions (20 microamperes 3 20–60 s). The animal received
an overdose of pentobarbital sodium (90 mg/kg, i.v.) and was perfused with
4% paraformaldehyde in 0.1 M phosphate buffer through the left ventricle of
the heart. Recording positions were reconstructed from 50 mm thick, stereo-
taxically oriented coronal brain sections and stained with cresyl violet. As
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ongoing recordings, we reconstructed recording positions approximately. In
Figure 2D, for reasons of simplicity, we collapsed recording sites from both
monkeys spanning roughly 5 mm in the anterior-posterior dimension onto
the same coronal outline. A small number of neurons (n = 8) were recorded
from the right hemisphere in animal A within the same architectonic regions
as those in the left hemisphere. No significant correlations were found between
neuronal positions and responses.
Data Collection
Eyemovements (behavioral choice data) were monitored using an infrared eye
tracking system with 5 ms resolution (ETL200; ISCAN). The percentages of
risky choices were analyzed with a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA
with risk and cue type (bars or abstract) as factors. Reaction times to key
release were analyzed by two single linear regressions across the three value
and the three risk measures. We compared the slopes (b) of the two regres-
sions to determine the effect sizes of these two parameters.
We recorded neuronal activity during imperative trials from single orbitofron-
tal neurons, typically in 20–30 min sessions, using standard electrophysiolog-
ical techniques including online visualization and discrimination of neuronal
impulses on oscilloscopes. Timings of neuronal discharges were stored by
custom-made software running on a Macintosh IIfx computer (Apple).
Typically, 10–15 trials of each trial type were performed per neuron.
Data Analysis
We analyzed the activity of each neuron in specific task epochs: 0.1–0.6 s after
cue onset; 0.5 s immediately preceding the saccade, key release, and reward;
and 0.5 s immediately following the saccade and the key release. The saccade,
key release, and reward were R1 s apart, thus warranting separate analysis
epochs. Also, we assessed immediate and tardive reward responses in four
nonoverlapping, consecutive postreward epochs of 0.5 s each.
The analysis of the neuronal data comprised two consecutive steps: first
identifying each specific task relationship as significant change of neuronal
activity related in time to a given task event, and then determining the param-
eter coded by these responses.
Identification of Task Relationship
First, we identified task-related responses by comparing neuronal activity in
each task epoch of all risk and value trials against a 1 s control period imme-
diately preceding the central fixation spot. We used the paired Wilcoxon test
on single trials, the pair consisting of the specific task period being tested
and the control period (p < 0.05, two-tailed). A task-related response was
defined as a significant change in activity between a given task epoch and
the control period.
Assessment of Coded Parameters
The second step of the analysis used linear regression models on the task-
related neuronal responses identified previously by the Wilcoxon test. In this
initial risk study on orbitofrontal cortex, we aimed to separate as much as
possible the risk and the value information for the animal, and presented in
separate trials the risk cues with the two possible reward magnitudes (and
constant mean magnitude) and the value cues with only single reward magni-
tudes possible (and constant no-risk) (Figures 1A, 1B, and 1D). Thus, adequate
regressions of neuronal responses on risk and value in separate trials required
separate single linear regressions. The regressors were the variance in risk
trials (9, 36, 144 3 104) and juice volume in value trials (0.18, 0.30, 0.42 ml).
The variance of a probability distribution is defined as:
var=
X
i
pi  ðxi  EVÞ2; for i= 1 to n
which, when applied to our probability distributions, is:
var= 0:5  ðxlow  EVÞ2 + 0:5 

xhigh  EV
2
where p is probability of reward, x ismagnitude of reward, EV is expected value
[EV = Si (pi * xi), i is index, and n is number of elements in the distribution
(outcomes)]. In a variation of this model, we used standard deviation (0.03,
0.06, 0.12 ml) as risk regressor (square root of variance) instead of variance.
In a further variation, we assessed the risk responses to the bar and abstractcues in separate regressions, in order to distinguish response relationships to
the risk information conveyed by the cues from their visual sensory properties.
The slopes of the linear regressions reflected the change in impulse activity
per unit of risk and value (impulses/s/ml), which is a direct physiological
measure of risk and value sensitivity. In an attempt to compare the effect sizes
of risk and value coding, we carried out a two-tailed t test on the unsigned
b values for value versus risk, using variance and standard deviation as risk
regressors separately.
As a formal test for independent coding of risk and value in the population of
responses, we counted the total number of significant and nonsignificant
responses for risk and value and entered these counts into a 23 2 contingency
table. We then carried out a chi-square test for independence on the contin-
gency table.
A second regression model tested further the postreward responses in risk
trials with amultiple linear regression on risk and rewardmagnitude. At the time
of reward, in risk trials, only a single reward magnitude was delivered, and all
risk trials contained information about both the risk associated with that trial
and the actually delivered reward magnitude. Thus the multiple linear regres-
sion tested in the risk trials whether the same neuronal responses following
reward (y values) varied with risk or reward magnitude (two x values). Reward
amounts in these trials were 0.18, 0.24, 0.30, 0.33, 0.36, and 0.42 ml. This
analysis enabled us to assess more directly whether the responses coded
the past risk related with reward magnitude or signaled the magnitude of the
reward delivered.
The results of this analysis revealed that linear risk-related responses might
alternatively be interpreted as nonmonotonic reward magnitude responses. If
this were the case, these neurons should also respond to reward magnitude
nonmonotonically in nonrisky trials. To assess this possibility, we tested
a subpopulation of these neurons with the nonrisky value cues and fit the
neuronal responses in value trials with linear and quadratic functions using
curve estimation regression in PASW Statistics (v18.0; IBM, Chicago, IL).
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